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SELECTIVE USE OF THE EXECUTIVE
IMMUNITY POWER: A DENIAL OF DUE
PROCESS?
I.

Introduction

Critical trial testimony can often be provided by witnesses who
are themselves implicated in a crime with which a defendant is
charged. These witnesses, while uncooperative for fear of self-incrimination, can be compelled by the government to testify under a
grant of statutory immunity. The ability to compel testimony has
greatly helped the government in prosecuting many crimes, particularly white-collar conspiracies. By granting immunity to lowerechelon members, inculpatory testimony is obtained against
higher-ups. As convictions are secured, the practice is repeated in
the process of "climbing the criminal ladder."'
In some instances, the defendant also has an interest in compelling uncooperative witnesses to testify at trial, particularly when
such witnesses will offer exculpatory evidence. To protect this interest, courts have alluded to the possibility that a defendant may
sometimes have a similiar right to witness immunity.2 However,
courts have been unwilling to infringe upon the discretion to grant
immunity conferred upon the executive branch by statute, absent a
showing of the government's bad faith in refusing defendant's request for defense witness immunity.3
In United States v. DePalma,' the United States District Court
1. A classic example of using the immunity power in order to reach the upper echelons of
a conspiracy is the Watergate prosecutions. Immunity was given to David Young, a member
of the White House staff, for his participation in the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office. This grant of immunity in turn led to the conviction of Egil Krogh, an assistant
to John Ehrlichman, one of President Nixon's chief aides. Krogh in turn testified against
Ehrlichman who was found guilty by a District of Columbia jury of directing the perpetration of this burglary. NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27, 1979, at 71, col. 1.
2. Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S.
921 (1967). See notes 26-33 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Earl footnote.
See also United States v. Lang, 589 F.2d 92, 96 n.1 (2d Cir. 1978) (distinguishing Earl footnote without rejecting its rationale); United States v. Ramsey, 503 F.2d 524, 533 (7th Cir.
1974) (distinguishing Earl footnote without rejecting its rationale), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 932
(1975).
3. United States v. Bacheler, 611 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Herman, 589
F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979); United States v. Lang, 589 F.2d
92 (2d Cir. 1978).
4. 476 F. Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), appeal docketed sub nom. United States v. Hor-
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for the Southern District of New York held that a defendant was
denied due process because of the government's refusal to immunize key defense witnesses after granting immunity to its own witnesses. The court offered the prosecution the choice of either immunizing the defendant's witnesses at a new trial or retrying its
case without the immunized testimony of its principal witness.
This decision, unique because of the absence of prosecutorial misconduct as a key element, will affect future prosecutions if upheld
by higher courts. The need to reevaluate the question of defense
witness immunity in light of the applicable standard of review, selective use of the executive immunity power, and the government's
burden of proof in ladder-climbing situations, is thus demonstrated.
Attacks on the government's immunity power have been premised upon numerous grounds, including the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, 5 the sixth amendment right to
compulsory process,' and the due process clause of the fifth amendment.7 This Note will focus on the due process clause. It is upon
this clause that the district court based its decision in DePalma
and from which the courts have the greatest power to achieve fundamental fairness. Indeed, the right to due process is comprehensive and broadly framed.' The concept has been described alternately as an application of "ordered liberty"' to the particular facts
witz, No. 79-1315 (2d Cir. Sept. 13, 1979).
5. The claim that the immunity statute itself violates the equal protection clause, because the government has the sole power to grant immunity, has been rejected. See, e.g.,
United States v. Graham, 548 F.2d 1302, 1315 (8th Cir. 1977); United States ex rel. Tatman
v. Anderson, 391 F. Supp. 68, 71 (D. Del. 1975).
6. United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1203 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
913 (1979); United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1005 (1978) ("The sixth amendment right of an accused to compulsory process to secure
the attendance of a witness does not include the right to compel the witness to waive his
fifth amendment privilege."); United States v. Smith, 542 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1976). See
generally Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for
Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REv. 567 (1978); Note, The Sixth Amendment Right to Have
Use Immunity Granted To Defense Witnesses, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1266 (1978); Westen, The
Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REv. 71 (1974).
7. United States v. Gleason, No. 79-1147 (2d Cir. Dec. 19, 1979); United States v. Lang,
589 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. DePalma, 476 F. Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),
appeal docketed sub nom. United States v. Horwitz, No. 79-1315 (2d Cir. Sept. 13, 1979).
8. See, e.g., Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REv. 71, 126-27 (1974).
9. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952), quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937).
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of each case ° and as a broad standard "of fairness written into the
Constitution . . . .,,1

Part II of this Note will review the traditional arguments against
challenging a prosecutor's immunity decision. The procedural and
substantive factors required for substantiating a defendant's due
process claim will be analyzed in part III. The way in which courts
have applied these factors in specific immunity situations, including DePalma, will be discussed in part IV. This Note will also examine the effect of immunization on the government's burden of
proof in future prosecutions and will offer a practical procedure for
reconciling the competing interests of both the government and the
defendant.
II. Traditional Arguments Against Challenging The
Prosecutor's Immunity Decision
A.

Background

The power of the government to compel persons to testify in
court, although "firmly established in Anglo-American jurisprudence,"'" is not absolute; it must be balanced against valid privileges, especially the fifth amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination. 3 Under a transactional immunity statute, 4 the
government's power to compel testimony does not violate a witness'
fifth amendment right because such a statute "accords full immunity from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled testi10. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
11. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 321 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
12. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972).
13. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself .. " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
14. Whenever in the judgment of a United States attorney the testimony of any witness . . .is necessary to the public interest, he, upon the approval of the Attorney
General, shall make application to the court that the witness shall be instructed to
testify
and upon order of the court such witness shall not be excused from testifying . . . on the ground that the testimony . . . required of him may tend to incriminate him . . . .But no such witness shall be prosecuted . . . for or on account of any
transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed
his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify . . .nor shall testimony so compelled be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding (except prosecution described
in the next sentence) against him in any court. No witness shall be exempt under this
section from prosecution for perjury or contempt committed while giving testimony
. . .under compulsion as provided in this section.
Pub. L. No. 84-728, 70 Stat. 574 (1956) (repealed 1970).
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mony relates."" Title 18, section 6002 of the United States
Code"(section 6002), provides for "use immunity," a more limited
grant of immunity. The statute, codifying portions of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,17 prohibits the prosecution from
using compelled testimony, and evidence directly gathered therefrom, as evidence in subsequent proceedings against the witness.
The question arises whether the use immunity granted under section 6002 is sufficiently broad to protect the fifth amendment rights
of an uncooperative witness compelled to testify. The Supreme
Court in Kastigar v. United States"'answered this question in the
affirmative. It concluded that "the immunity provided by 18
U.S.C. § 6002 leaves the witness and the prosecutorial authorities
in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed the
Fifth Amendment privilege."" If the defense witness is not granted
immunity, he can assert his fifth amendment privilege and the
prosecution will be without this testimonial evidence upon which to
later base an indictment against him. Likewise, by granting the
witness immunity, the prosecution is still without power to use tes20
timony proffered at the trial.

The government alleges that one of the major advantages of the
"use immunity" statute, as opposed to the "transactional immunity" statute, is also its nemesis. Under Kastigar, the prosecution
has "the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to
use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the
compelled testimony." ' 21 Thus, while under a "transaction" statute
a witness could reveal just enough information to acquire an "im15.
16.

Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976) provides:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination,
to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to (1) a court or grand jury of the United States . . .and the person presiding over
the proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against selfincrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or
any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for
perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
17. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
18. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
19. Id. at 462.
20. In both instances, independent avenues of investigation are available to the prosecution. See notes 60-61 infra and accompanying text.
21. 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972).
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munity bath"22 and then profess to remember no more, a use immunity statute such as section 6002 encourages more complete testimony. However, the more information a witness reveals, the more
difficult it becomes for the government to prosecute him on the basis of demonstrably independent evidence."
In Earl v. United States,"' an undercover police officer testified
that he purchased heroin from one Frank Scott and was told by
Scott to give the money to the defendant, who was standing next to
Scott. At trial, Scott, from whom the court had accepted a guilty
plea on some counts, asserted his fifth amendment privilege when
called to testify by the defense. Defendant claimed that the government's refusal to grant immunity to Scott barred the witness from
offering exculpatory testimony. Chief Justice Warren Burger, then
a circuit judge, held that the court was without power to command
the executive branch of government to exercise its statutory immunity power.2"
Of particular interest to this discussion is a footnote in the decision. There, Chief Justice Burger posed the following hypothetical:
We might have quite different, and more difficult, problems had the Government in this case secured testimony from one eyewitness by granting him
immunity while declining to seek an immunity grant for Scott to free him
from possible incrimination to testify for Earl. That situation would vividly
dramatize an argument on behalf of Earl that the statute as applied denied
him due process. Arguments could be advanced that in the particular case
the Government could not use the immunity statute for its advantage unless
Congress made the same mechanism available to the accused. Here we are
asked in effect to rewrite a statute so as to make available to
the accused a
2
procedure which Congress granted only to the Government.

Judge Sweet's decision in United States v. DePalma heralds the
Earl footnote's coming of age. The scenario suggested by the footnote, while not exactly the DePalmasituation,2 7 is sufficiently simi22. In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1222 (4th Cir. 1973).
23.

UNITED STATES JUSTICE DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES RELATING TO USE OF STATUTORY PROVI-

SIONS TO COMPEL TESTIMONY OR PRODUCTION OF INFORMATION,

comment to § 10, at 28 (1977)

[hereinafter cited as GUIDELINES].

24. 361 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967).
25. For the effect of Kastigar upon this holding, see notes 52-54 infra and accompanying
text.
26. 361 F.2d at 534 n.1 (emphasis on "as applied" in original; emphasis on "unless"
added).
27. The government attempts to distinguish DePalma from the Earl footnote on the basis of a grant of informal immunity, see note 137 infra, to a principal prosecution witness in
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lar to it to have warranted extensive discussion by both the government and the defendant in their appellate briefs."8 The Earl
decision encompasses the traditional arguments made both for and
against the propriety of allowing the criminal defendant some
power in extending immunity to witnesses in his favor. Earl therefore provides an efficacious starting point for analysis of the defense
witness immunity question.2 It is submitted, however, that a rephrasing of the footnote's "unless" clause" in the following manner
would place the issue in a more proper perspective: "In the particular case the Government could not use the immunity statute for
its advantage unless the Government grants immunity to a defense
witness when necessary to ensure the defendant due process and to
serve the public interest."'" It is not mandatory to characterize the
DePalma. In the footnote, Chief Justice Burger was speaking of a possible unconstitutional
use of the immunity statute. Brief for Government at 23 n.*, United States v. Horwitz, No.
79-1315 (2d Cir. Sept. 13, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Government]. Chief Justice
Burger was concerned not only with the statute per se but also with the government's selective grant of immunity to its own witness. This is evidenced by his emphasis on the application of the statute. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
Another strained distinction is founded upon a reading of bad faith into the footnote. Brief
for Government, supra, at 45 n.*. See also note 90 infra. There was no finding of
prosecutorial misconduct in DePalma, 476 F. Supp. at 777 n.5. See also notes 149-52 infra
and accompanying text. However, there could be an analysis along the same lines that
would reveal an even more egregious example of prosecutorial misconduct in DePalma because there, the government granted immunity to a prosecution non-eyewitness but refused
to immunize an eyewitness for the defendant.
28. Brief for Government, supra note 27, at 22, 23, 25-27, 31, 45, 46; Brief for Appellee at
22-24, United States v. Horwitz, No. 79-1315 (2d Cir. Sept. 13, 1979)[hereinafter cited as
Brief for Appellee]. The DePalma court states that both the government and Horwitz consider Earl the "seminal opinion on this issue." 476 F. Supp. at 780.
The Earl footnote is particularly relevant because it emphasizes that selective use of immunity is an important factor to be considered in the resolution of an asserted due process
violation. The court in DePalma explicitly found selectivity to be one of the case's "peculiar
facts." 476 F. Supp. at 780 n.13, 781. See notes 136-49 infra and accompanying text.
29. Many immunity cases have referred to both the Earl decision and its footnote. See,
e.g., United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512, 518 n.12 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Rocco, 587 F.2d 144, 147 n.10 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979); United States
v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31, 35 n.3 (2d Cir, 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979); United States
v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); United States v.
'Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 229 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976).
30. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
31. This rephrasing would be consistent with the Justice Department Guidelines: "The
provisions of 18 U.S.C. 6001-6003 are not to be used to compel testimony or production of
other information on behalf of a defendant except in extraordinary circumstances where the
defendant plainly would be deprived of a fair trial without such testimony or other information." Guidelines, supra note 23, § 11. This position also finds support in the immunity
statute. 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b)(1) (1976). See note 34 infra.
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problem as forcing the judiciary into performing a legislative function, as Chief Justice Burger suggests, or of encroaching upon the
prosecution's vested authority.2 Alternative and less drastic means
can achieve the intended result of arriving at the truth in a crimi3
nal proceeding.

B.

3

The Courts' Role In Immunity Decisions

A strict interpretation of 18 U.S.C. section 600311 (section 6003)
indicates that the prosecution has absolute discretion in requesting
an immunity order.3 5 One court has noted that the power to grant
immunity is intended solely to benefit the government. 36 The statute's legislative history reveals that Congress read the courts' role
32. See notes 35-67 infra and accompanying text.
33. Virgin Islands v. Smith, No. 79-1212, slip op. at 13 (3d Cir. Feb. 5, 1980) ("[Tihe
essential task of a criminal trial is to search for truth .,..."); Earl v. United States, 364
F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (denial of petition for rehearing en banc denied) (statement by JJ.
Leventhal, Bazelon, Fahy and Wright in favor of en banc consideration) ("The immunity
statute was passed in furtherance of the search for truth ....
.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1976) provides:
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify or provide other information at any proceeding before or anciliary to a court of the United
States or a grand jury of the United States, the United States district court for the
judicial district in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue in accordance
with subsection (b) of this section, upon the request of the United States attorney for
such district, an order requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other
information which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of this
part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney General, the
Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney General, request an
order under subsection (a) of this section when in his judgment(1) the testimony or other information from such individual be necessary to
the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide
other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.
See also United States v. LaDuca, 447 F. Supp. 779, 788 (D.N.J.), aff'd on other grounds sub
nom. Rocco v. United States, 587 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1978) ("The public interest is surely
advanced where all testimony relevant to ascertaining the defendant's guilt or innocence is
available.").
35. "A United States attorney may . . . request an [immunity] order . . . when in his
judgment . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b) (1976) (emphasis added). "[Tihe United States district
court . . . shall issue .
[an immunity order] upon the request of the United States attorney.
... 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (a) (1976) (emphasis added). See note 34 supra.
36. United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1200 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
913 (1979). The court also noted that the legislative purpose of the immunity statute is to
"strengthen the hand of the prosecution and to weaken that of the criminal defendant." Id.
at 1202.
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in granting an immunity order as limited to finding the facts upon
which the order is predicated. 7 For this reason, the function of district court review of the prosecution's decision to extend or withhold immunity has been characterized as essentially a ministerial
task. 8
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the cases which impose a
"ministerial task" limitation upon district court review involved a
prosecutor's decision to grant immunity. In defense witness immunity cases, the opposite situation is presented; it is the government's denial of defendant's request for witness immunity that is
the basis of an alleged due process violation. Although one court
has questioned the validity of distinguishing between decisions to
extend and withhold immunity,"0 that same court alluded to the
appropriateness, in certain circumstances, of reviewing a prosecutor's decision not to grant immunity." Because the statute authorizes the granting of immunity only upon the request of the United
States attorney, 2 another court has held that the only grounds
upon which a court can review a prosecutor's immunity decision
are the sixth amendment or the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. 3 Indeed, courts have not hesitated to review the merits of a federal prosecutor's immunity decision when it has been
37.

H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 43, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG.

& AD. NEWS 4007, 4018.
38. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 432-33 (1956) (predecessor statute construed
to withhold from the district court "any discretion to deny the order on the ground that the
public interest does not warrant it"); United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1201 (district
court limited in its review "to determine whether the formal prerequisites for an immunity
grant had been complied with before granting the order"); II WORKING PAPERS, NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 1435 (1970) [hereinafter cited as WORKING
PAPERS].

39. See note 38 supra and accompanying text. See also United States v. Ellis, 595 F.2d
154, 163 (3d Cir. 1979) (defendants were without standing to contest the propriety of the
granting of immunity by the government to witnesses testifying against them); United
States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 402 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
40. United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1201 ("The same separation of powers concerns that compelled Ulman's construction of the statute to deny any possibility that a
court might bar the prosecutor's application for a grant of immunity apply with equal force
to a court order requiring such a grant.").
41. "[T]he gravamen of the Ulman holding is that judicial interests of non-constitutional stature are insufficient to permit intervention in the prosecutor's immunization
decision." Id. (emphasis added).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 6003(a) (1976).
43. United States v. Turkish, No. 78-251, slip op. at 8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 1979), appeal
docketed, No. 79-1326 (2d Cir. Oct. 19, 1979).
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alleged that the prosecutor's discretion has been exercised in a
manner which violates the defendant's right to due process."
Recent Supreme Court cases emphasize that the due process
clause can limit other claims of executive prerogative. In United
States v. Lovasco,45 a case involving pre-indictment delay which
the defendant claimed prejudiced his trial, the Supreme Court,
while recognizing that the due process clause "does not permit
courts to abort criminal prosecutions simply because they disagree
with a prosecutor's judgment . . .,"" went on to explain exactly

what the courts are empowered to do: "We are to determine only
whether the action complained of.

.

.violates those 'fundamental

conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political
institutions -.

. . .'"'

Courts should not be relegated to serve as

mere "recording agencies""8 in immunity or other situations where
abuses of constitutional magnitude have been asserted by a criminal defendant.
In United States v. Nixon,4" the former President appealed a trial
court's denial of his motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum directing him to produce certain tape recordings and documents. The
Court held that judicial review of a President's claim of privilege
was within its power granted by article Ill, section 1 of the Constitution,50 within the basic concept of separation of powers and
checks and balances, and within the spirit of Marbury v.
Madison.5 Just as production of tapes and documents in Nixon
was deemed essential to a fair trial, there may be an analogous
need for immunization of a defense witness which could override
government reluctance to grant defense witness immunity. What is
important to note at this point is the power and duty of the courts
to vindicate the guarantees of the Constitution, including the fifth
44. See, e.g., United States v. Gleason, No. 79-1147 (2d Cir. Dec. 19, 1979); United
States v. Lang, 589 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976).
45. 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
46. Id.at 790.
47. Id.(quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)).

48.

WORKING PAPERS,

supra note 38, at 1435.

49. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
50. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court
§ 1.
.... U.S. CONST. art. III,
51. "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703-05, citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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amendment proviso that no person shall be deprived of liberty
without due process of law.
Another impediment to a court's ability to undertake a review of
a prosecutor's immunity decision is the formal "separation of powers" argument. It has been present in the arguments discussed
above because this concept, that of statutory interpretation and
district court review, are all inextricably linked. Pre-Kastigar cases
generally held it to be peculiarly within the government's absolute
authority to seek immunity in order to secure testimony. The judiciary's ostensible powerlessness can be traced to the grave consequences of a grant of statutory transactional immunity.5 2 After
Kastigar's upholding of statutory use immunity, however, the
costs to the government when it grants immunity are reduced. 3 It
is doubtful, therefore, whether "transaction" decisions like Earl,
with their emphasis on the separation of powers, are dispositive of
the use immunity issue.5
Furthermore, analogies to executive powers, such as a decision
whether to prosecute and what charges to file,55 are not persuasive
in this context. These discretionary decisions, like those granting
immunity, undoubtedly have constitutional limits. Moreover,
while the decision to grant immunity to a witness may be part of
the charging process,57 it is not necessarily equivalent to a decision
not to charge the witness with a crime. 8 Equating a decision to
prosecute with a decision to immunize assumes the government
would never be able to meet Kastigar's "independent source" burden59 in a subsequent prosecution of a previously-immunized witness. It is true that the government's case would collapse if it had
no evidence against a witness other than his tainted immunized
52. United States v. Earl, 361 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921
(1967). "In the context of criminal justice it is one of the highest forms of discretion conferred by Congress on the Executive, i.e., a decision to give formal and binding absolution in
a judicial proceeding to insure that an individual's testimony will be compelled without subjecting him to criminal prosecution for what he might say.").
53. The government can prosecute the immunized witness in the future if it has evidence
other than the witness' immunized testimony. See notes 60-61 infra and accompanying text.
54. United States v. Gaither, 539 F.2d 753, 754 n.1 (D.C. Cir.) (denying petition for rehearing en banc)(per curiam)(statement of Bazelon, C.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 961 (1976).
55. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
56. Id. at 365.
57. In re Weber, 11 Cal. 3d 703, 720, 523 P.2d 229, 240, 114 Cal. Rptr. 429, 440 (1974).
58. But see Brief for Government, supra note 27, at 17.
59. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
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testimony. However, it is equally true that in circumstances where
incriminating evidence exists prior to immunization, the prosecution can follow clearly defined procedures" to ensure that this evidence is insulated from the tainted testimony. It could then be
used in a future prosecution against the witness.
It is clear that the government's Kastigar burden varies from
case to case. 1 Therefore, this burden should not automatically act
as a bar to judicial review on the merits of defendant's immunity
request, as the logic of a "separation of powers" argument would
inevitably conclude. 2
Blanket allowance of executive privilege to override a defendant's request for immunity for his witness63 could impair a defendant's guarantee of due process of law. 4 The Supreme Court in
Nixon reached its conclusion by balancing the President's genera60. The Guidelines provide:
In a case in which a person is to testify or provide other information pursuant to a
compulsion order:
(a) if it then appears that the public interest may warrant a future prosecution of
the witness, on the basis of independent evidence, for his past criminal conduct about
which he is to be questioned, the attorney for the government shall:
(1) before the witness has testified or provided other information, prepare for
the case file a signed and dated memorandum summarizing the evidence then
known to exist concerning the witness, and designating its sources and date of
receipt;
(2) ensure that all testimony given, or information provided, by the witness
be recorded verbatim and that the recording or reporter's notes, together with
any transcript thereof, be maintained in a secure location and that access
thereto be documented; and
(3) maintain a record of the nature, source, and date of receipt of evidence
concerning the witness' past criminal conduct that becomes available after he
has testified or provided other information . ..
GUIDELINES, supra note 23, § 7.
61. Note, Right Of The Criminal Defendant To The Compelled Testimony Of Witnesses,
67 COLUM. L. REV. 953, 961 (1967).

62. The logic would probably be: (1) a grant of use immunity is equivalent to one of
transactional immunity because the government always has an insurmountable Kastigar
burden; (2) the decision to grant use immunity is equivalent to agreeing not to prosecute the
witness in the future; (3) the immunity decision is equivalent to a charging decision; (4) the
executive has absolute discretion in making a charging decision; (5) the executive has absolute discretion in making an immunity decision; (6) therefore, the court has no power to
review the immunity decision.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Bautista, 509 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 976 (1975); United States v. Ramsey, 503 F.2d 524, 532 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 932 (1975); United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 190 (3d Cir. 1973).
64. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712 (allowance of executing privilege would
withhold demonstrably relevant evidence from defendant's trial).
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lized interest in confidentiality against the constitutional need for
all relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding. 5 The government in
DePalmadoes not rely solely upon the generalized notion of executive privilege as conferred under section 6003. Rather, the government's strongest argument is a practical one that emphasizes the
deleterious effect of defense witness immunization upon ladderclimbing prosecutions." Therefore, the suggestion that the issue of
defense witness immunity be removed entirely from the "separation of powers" framework"7 is not justifiable; the government has
legitimate interests to protect as does a defendant. Moreover, the
suggestion smacks of a legislative, not a judicial, analysis as the
statute vests discretion in the executive branch.
III.

Requirements To Establish Due Process Violations

Recent cases have emphasized that the defendant must lay a
sufficient procedural and substantive foundation for an immunityrelated due process claim. The requisite factors include a timely
showing that the desired witness will assert his fifth amendment
right and that denial of defendant's request for witness immunity
will result in the exclusion of relevant testimony. Whether selective
use of the executive immunity power and government bad faith are
also prerequisites is currently an open question.
A.

Procedural Requirements

Section 6003 provides that a United States attorney may request
an immunity order when, inter alia, the witness "has refused or is
likely to refuse to testify . . . on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination." ' Notwithstanding the leeway provided in the
statute, legislative preference is for the witness to specifically claim
his privilege to receive immunity." In United States v. Wright,7"
the Second Circuit explains why a defendant's due process claim,
65. Id. at 712 n.19.
66. See notes 163-67 infra and accompanying text.
67. Note, "The Public Has a Claim to Every Man's Evidence:" The Defendant's Constitutional Right to Witness Immunity, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1213 (1978) (footnote
omitted).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (b)(2) (1976) (emphasis added).
69. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 42, reprinted in [19701 U.S. CoDE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4007, 4018.
70. 588 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979).
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premised upon the prosecutor's failure to grant immunity to a potential defense witness, was fatally flawed:
Because Wright failed to subpoena Parker and to prove any need for use
immunity, he cannot now demonstrate that the refusal to confer immunity
prejudiced his trial . . . Whether Parker would have maintained the position that his attorney asserted, had he actually been subpoenaed and called
to the stand, is a matter of speculation upon which this court cannot base a
finding that Wright was denied his due process right to a fair trial.7

The court's concern is with a witness who, prepared to testify if
actually subpoenaed and put under oath, might state in advance
that he would invoke his fifth amendment privilege in the hope
that he thereby would not be called.72 Despite this contingency, another circuit has not strictly adhered to a subpoena requirement. In
United States v. Klauber73 the Fourth Circuit proceeded on the assumption that the defendant's due process claim was preserved despite the fact that the proposed defense witness was never subpoenaed. Nevertheless, counsel for the witness had previously stated
that his client would not testify without a grant of immunity. The
government's conduct at the trial indicated that it accepted this
fact."
In addition to a sufficient showing by the defendant that a proposed witness will refuse to testify without immunity, the defendant's demonstration of need for the testimony must be timely. In
5 more than five and one half months
United States v. Turkish,"
elapsed between the first pre-trial conference and the beginning of
trial. During this period, the defendants never revealed any intention of requesting immunization of witnesses. The demand was first
made in the middle of the trial. This late request would have hampered the prosecutor's ability to make a meaningful immunity recommendation to the United States attorney" and increased the al71.

Id. at 36-37.

72. United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512, 514 (4th Cir. 1979)(footnote omitted) (dictum). See also United States v. Praetorius, No. 79-1134 (2d Cir. Dec. 10, 1979) (explicit
precondition that proposed witness be subpoenaed and necessary to the defense).
73. 611 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1979).
74. Id. at 514.
75. No. 78-251 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 1979), appeal docketed No. 79-1326 (2d Cir. Oct. 19,
1979).

76. The Guidelines provide:
An attorney for the government may request authorization, from the Assistant Attorney General with responsibility for the subject matter of the case, to apply for an
order, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 6003, compelling a person to testify or provide other

892

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. VIII

ready "heavy burden"" imposed on the government if it chose to
pursue a future indictment of the proposed witnesses. As a result,
the court dismissed the defendants' applications as untimely."
B.

Substantive Requirements
1. Relevant Testimony

In order to secure immunity for a defense witness, the defendant
must show that the testimony of a witness is crucial to his defense.
If the desired testimonial evidence is merely cumulative of evidence already before the jury, exclusion of such evidence would not
deny the defendant his due process rights." It is necessary that the
testimony be material"° and vital8 to the defense to establish a constitutional violation. A showing that the testimony is potentially
exculpatory would be a sufficient basis. 2 Where the defendant does
not offer evidence as to what the witness has said in the past or
information . .

.

.The request for authorization shall contain sufficient information

to permit the Assistant Attorney General, and the United States Attorney for the
district in which the motion for the order is to be made, to make an independent
judgment regarding the public interest and the likelihood of the refusal to testify.
GUIDELINES, supra note 23, § 2.
77. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461 (1972).
78. United States v. Turkish, No. 78-251, slip op. at 8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 1979), appeal
docketed, No. 79-1326 (2d Cir. Oct. 19, 1979); see also United States v. LaDuca, 447 F.
Supp. 779, (D.N.J.), aff'd on other grounds sub nor. Rocco v. United States, 587 F.2d 144
(3d Cir. 1978) (defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence was denied as untimely because the defendant had not made a request at trial for
immunization of the witness who was the source of the evidence).
79. United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948
(1976); United States v. Gleason, No. 79-1147, slip op. 659, 708 (2d Cir. Dec. 19, 1979)(witness' testimony would at best be cumulative of the defendant's testimony).
80. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957) (improper for the government to
withhold identity of an informer whose testimony would have been significant); Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104-07 (1976);
United States v. Morell, 524 F.2d 550, 557 (2d Cir. 1975).
81. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 896.
82. Earl v. United States, 364 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (denial of petition for rehearing
en banc)(statement by JJ. Leventhal, Bazelon, Fahy and Wright in favor of en banc consideration), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967); United States v. LaDuca, 447 F. Supp. 779, 787
(D.N.J.), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Rocco v. United States, 587 F.2d 144 (3d Cir.
1978)(sixth amendment breach would occur if the government withheld immunity which
would make exculpatory testimony available to the defendant)(dictum). Cf. Virgin Islands
v. Smith, No. 79-1212, slip op. at 9 n.7 (3d Cir. Feb. 5, 1980) ("Immunity . . .need not be
predicated upon a finding that the witness' testimony is clearly exculpatory or otherwise
essential to the defendant's case . .

.

.The trial court must find, however, that the proffered

testimony would be relevant to the defendant's case.").
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what he is expected to offer in court, the defendant has not met
this burden. 3
2. Selective Use of Immunity Power
A perplexing question in defense witness immunity cases is
whether the selective use by the government of its immunity
power" is a prerequisite for a defendant's due process claim. One
court has argued that the government's extension of immunity to
its own witnesses is irrelevant in demonstrating a violation of defendant's right of due process:
While it is true that the fundamental fairness of a trial is affected by the
presence of the immunity power in the government's and not the defendant's arsenal, it is the availability and not the use of the power which creates the imbalance. If the government immunizes a witness and the defendant's important witnesses do not require immunity, the trial is not thereby
rendered fundamentally unfair. Conversely, if the defendant's important
witnesses do require immunity, the defendant should not be foreclosed from
this right merely because the government chose not to exercise the power on
its own behalf. In addition, an equation which includes the factor of government use of immunity for its own witnesses would permit the government to
avoid its responsibility to request immunity for a defendant where otherwise
appropriate merely by declining to use the immunity power for itself.85

This argument recognizes that an imbalance in the government's
favor can exist independently of the selective use of the immunity
power. It is incorrect, however, to dismiss the actual use of the immunity power by the government as irrelevant. It is likely that the
immunization of and resulting testimony by a government witness
would be damaging to the defense because an important consideration guiding a prosecutor's decision to grant immunity is whether
83. United States v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 1345, 1361-62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 909
(1977); Singleton v. Lefkowitz, 583 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979)
(trial court's holding that petitioner had not shown that the testimony of either co-conspirator would be favorable to his defense, a conclusion based partially on defense counsel's lack
of knowledge of what the witness would testify to, was overturned by the court of appeals);
United States v. Finkelstein, 526 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1975)' cert. denied, 425 U.S. 960 (1976)
(One appellant made a motion to sever the trial so that co-defendants could offer exculpatory testimony. The court held that there was an insufficient showing that co-defendant
would testify at a severed trial and waive his fifth amendment privilege).
84. See note 137 infra for differences between grants of statutory and informal immunity.
For purposes of this discussion, the two will be considered equivalent.
85. United States v. Turkish, No. 78-251, slip op. at 19-20 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 1979) (dictum), appeal docketed, No. 79-1326 (2d Cir. Oct. 19, 1979).
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the testimony will be helpful to the government."8 This "availability rather than use" argument 7 ignores the reality that the government's extension of immunity to its own witnesses is the means by
which inculpatory testimony against the defendant is elicited. Although not a material factor in itself, selective use can aggravate
the imbalance already present at trial due to the defendant's inability to present a full defense."
3.

Government Bad Faith

Another perplexing issue in the area of defense witness immunity
is whether government bad faith is a prerequisite to a defendant's
due process claim. Bad faith is a prerequisite in other circumstances where the government exercises wide discretion."0 Moreover, the Earl footnote has been construed as requiring a finding of
government misconduct before a due process violation is recognized 0 although it does not explicitly discuss the bad faith requireGUIDELINES, supra note 23, comment to § 3(b)'.
87. The argument has been suggested by other courts. See, e.g., Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14 (1967) (defendant's right to present full defense does not depend upon the manner in which the state presents its case); United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976). The Alessio court lists the state's grant of immunity to a
prosecution witness as a factor, but then disregards it in determining whether defendant was
deprived of due process. This can be explained by the fact that the witness' testimony was
only cumulative. Id. at 1082. Because the defendant never satisfied one of the initial prerequisites, the issue of selectivity was never reached. See also Note, The Sixth Amendment
Right To Have Use Immunity Granted To Defense Witnesses, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1266, 1270
(1978).
88. It cannot be denied that the method in which the government conducts its case can
affect a defendant's trial. In Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), the petitioner,
president of a mine workers union, was convicted of filing a false affidavit stating that he
Was not a member of the Communist Party. The government's case was built on the testimony of two witnesses paid by the FBI. Id. at 659. In reviewing the trial court's denial of
petitioner's motion to inspect the reports filed by the witnesses with the FBI, the Supreme
Court remarked: "The crucial nature of the testimony of Ford and Matusow to the Government's case is conspicuously apparent. The impeachment of the testimony was singularly
important to the petitioner." Id. at 667.
89. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971) (due process clause would require
dismissal of indictment if defendant could prove, inter alia, that the delay was "an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused") (footnote omitted). See United
States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974)(the defendant "bears the heavy burden
of establishing . . . that the government's discriminatory selection of him for prosecution
has been invidious or in bad faith . . ."). But see United States v. Calzada, 579 F.2d 1358,
1362 n.9 (7th Cir.) (in a case involving the government's deportation of a material witness,
"a finding of 'bad faith' or prosecutorial misconduct is not a precondition to dismissing an
indictment . . ."), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 920 (1978).
90. Brief for Government, supra note 27, at 45 n.*. The government contends that, in the

86.
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ment. 11 Two relatively recent Third Circuit cases have dealt with
this issue.
In United States v. Morrison," the government conducted an intimidating interview with a prospective defense witness. The interview prompted the witness to assert her fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination at the defendant's trial. Although the
government did not extend immunity to any prosecution witnesses,
its refusal to grant immunity to defendant's witness was held to
have deprived the defendant of relevant evidence and a fair trial.
The court remarked:
There are circumstances under which it appears due process may demand
that the Government request use immunity for a defendant's witness ....
Such a circumstance was created in this case when prosecutorial misconduct
caused the defendant's principal witness to withhold out of fear of self-incrimination testimony which would otherwise allegedly have been available
to the defendant. 3

The misconduct present in Morrison, although undeniably integral
to the government's plan to later withhold immunity, occurred
prior to the prosecution's denial of defendant's request for witness
immunity. Had the harassing interview not occurred, the witness
would not have invoked the fifth amendment and the immunity
issue would never have been raised. Although the court mentioned
that prosecutorial bad faith was one circumstance in which such a
conclusion could be justified, it did not hold that lack of bad faith
would necessarily bar a due process claim.
In contrast to Morrison, the same court in United States v. Herman'4 expressly stated that government bad faith is a prerequisite
for a due process claim. In this case, two former state court magistrates, Herman and McCann, were convicted of racketeering and
accepting bribes. Two government witnesses, a former bail bondsman and a secretary from the agency where he worked, testified
against Herman under grants of immunity. The prosecution denied
Earl hypothetical, the prosecution improperly or arbitrarily chose to immunize the eyewitness who inculpated the defendant and not the witness who could have offered exculpatory
testimony. This is not necessarily suggested by the Earl footnote. The government there
could have had a valid reason for not granting defendant's request. To belabor the already
vague footnote would be fruitless.
91. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
92. 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976).
93. Id. at 229.
94. 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979).

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. VIII

Herman's request for immunity for prospective defense witnesses.

The court rejected Herman's due process claim because he failed to
meet a "substantial"
reversal:

evidentiary showing required to justify

The defendant must be prepared to show that the government's decisions
were made with the deliberate intention of distorting the judicial fact-finding process. Where such a showing is made, the court has inherent remedial
power to require that the distortion be redressed by requiring a grant of use
immunity to defense witnesses as an alternative to dismissal."

The court made no attempt to explain what types of intentional
misconduct, other than that present in Morrison, might be so egregious as to distort the "judicial fact finding process." It is logical to
assume that, under Herman, decisions made in order to safeguard
legitimate governmental interests would be justifiable; only those
made to conceal relevant evidence"6 from the defendant would provide a basis for a due process claim.
It has been argued that the Brady v. Maryland7 rule should be
applied in immunity situations. In this case, the petitioner and a
companion were convicted of first degree murder in a state court.
Prior to the trial, petitioner requested transcripts of witness statements in which the witness admitted committing the homicide. 8
The prosecution withheld the admission. The Supreme Court held
that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to
an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution."" The justification for extending the Brady rule to defense witness immunity cases is that
the government's denial of a defendant's immunity request is
equivalent to the suppression of exculpatory evidence in its possession. However, courts have almost unanimously refused to extend
the Brady rule to immunity situations. 0 ° The rationale most often
95. Id. at 1204.
96. See text accompanying notes 79-83 supra.
97. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
98. Id. at 84.
99. Id. at 87.
100. United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 1356 n.115 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1087 (1976); Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
388 U.S. 921 (1967); United States ex rel. Tatman v. Anderson, 391 F. Supp. 68, 71-72 (D.
Del. 1975). But see United States v. Turkish, No. 78-251, slip op. at 33 n.21 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
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used is that the witness' fifth amendment assertion was a product
of voluntary choice, not government intimidation. 0 ' This is therefore not a Brady suppression, it is argued, because the government
has not affirmatively withheld the evidence. Brady, however, explicitly rejects the materiality of the good or bad faith of the prosecutor. The case should not be interpreted as a mere suppression
based on ensuring the accused's right to precase but rather as one
10 2
defense.
full
a
sent
It has also been argued that Brady suppression cases are inapposite to immunity situations because, in the latter cases, the government does not actually possess the relevant testimony which the
defendant requires for his defense. However, drawing a distinction
between the dominion and control the government retains when
physical or testimonial evidence is in its possession and the power
it has, via statute, to control access to information in a witness'
possession, emphasizes form over substance. 3 In sum, the subordination of the "government conduct" factor in due process immunity analysis would harmonize Brady and immunity cases; attention thereby would be focused on the affirmative discovery rights of
the defendant" 4 rather than on punishing prosecutorial misconduct.
17, 1979)(dictum), appeal docketed, No. 79-1326 (2d Cir. Oct. 19, 1979); United States v.
Saettele, 585 F.2d 307, 313 (8th Cir. 1978)(dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910
(1979).
101. But see United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824
(1976).
102. See Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 121-22 (1974).
See also 2 A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIA MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES

§ 317, at 2-247-48 (2d ed. 1971).

103. See Note, A Re-Examination Of Defense Witness Immunity: A New Use For Kastigar, 10 HARV. J. LEGIS. 74, 86 (1974). When a defendant's right to due process is involved, it
seems incongruous to impose a burden on the government in Brady situations irrespective of
its good or bad faith, and not to impose any burden on the government, or to impose it only
upon a showing of bad faith, in immunity situations. In both circumstances the evidence
sought is crucial for the defense. Such a right to due process should not revolve around the
prosecutor's bad faith; the defendant would be -in the same position regardless.
Judge Garth, dissenting in Herman, equated the prosecution's denial of a defendant's immunity request with the situation in Brady when he wrote that "a due process violation in
the present context should [not] require the defendant to prove the subjective bad faith of
the government in order to establish his due process claim." 589 F.2d at 1206.
104. See Note, "The Public Has a Claim to Every Man's Evidence": The Defendant's
Constitutional Right to Witness Immunity, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1213 (1978) (footnote
omitted).
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IV. Recent Immunity Decisions
The majority of the recent cases have rejected defendants' due
process claims, including reverse immunity situations similar to
DePalma. These decisions can usually be traced to an inadequate
showing by the defendant of one of the substantive and procedural
requirements discussed previously.1°5
In United States v. Bacheler,0° the defendants, convicted of engaging in racketeering, bribery, and conspiracy, claimed that their
right to a fair trial had been violated. The prosecution had granted
immunity to its own witness but the trial court refused to compel
the government to immunize a prospective defense witness. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected the
defendants' claim because it did not "rise to the level of constitutional deprivation encompassed in the Herman discussion. '"1)7
The court also based its decision on the defendants' failure to
demonstrate the exclusion of clearly exculpatory testimony.
In the Second Circuit, similar procedural and substantive inadequacies have vitiated immunity-based due process claims. In
0 o officers of the Franklin National Bank
United States v. Gleason,'
were convicted of various bank frauds. Gleason, former chairman of
the bank, contended that his due process rights were violated by
the government's refusal to grant statutory use immunity to an al09
leged co-conspirator who was charged in a separate indictment.
The court held that there was no due process violation despite the
informal immunization" o of two lesser government witnesses. The
court deferred to the United States attorney's discretion in immunity decision-making. The court additionally noted that the defendant did not claim that the potential witness would offer exculpatory evidence; rather, it "would at best be merely cumulative of
Gleason's testimony and from an obviously interested witness who
would be subject to intensive cross-examination that might well
destroy his credibility.""' Finally, there was no evidence of
prosecutorial misconduct in order to gain a tactical advantage over
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See text accompanying notes 68-83 supra,
611 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1979).
Id. at 450.
No. 79-1147 (2d Cir. Dec. 19, 1979).
Id., slip op. at 706.
For a discussion of informal immunity, see note 138 infra.
No. 79-1147, slip op. at 708 (2d Cir. Dec. 19, 1979).
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the defendant.
The Second Circuit's strict subpoena requirement"' was recently
reaffirmed"' in United States v. Praetorius."4 Here, seven defendants were found guilty of involvement in a heroin importation conspiracy. One appellant contended that the trial court should have
ordered statutory immunity for a defense witness."' The court had
denied the request because the desired testimony was only probative of the credibility of one of the government informants and was
therefore considered a collateral matter insufficient to require the
grant of immunity.' 6 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reiterated its general rule that "the United States need not ordinarily grant statutory immunity to a defense witness.""' 7 It did, however, acknowledge that the decision in Wright"' left open the possibility that certain, albeit unspecified, circumstances would
mandate the government's conferral of use immunity on a defense
witness so as not to violate a defendant's right to due process.
However, because this appellant never subpoenaed the potential
witness,"' the question of the government's possible duty to grant
immunity was never reached by the court.' 0
Satisfactory compliance with the procedural and substantive requirements described earlier'2 ' was present in United States v.
112. See text accompanying notes 69-72 supra.
113. The subpoena requirement's progenitor is United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31 (2d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979). See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra.
114. No. 79-1134 (2d Cir. Dec. 10, 1979).
115. Id., slip op. at 5661. Despite the fact that this witness was granted informal letter
immunity by the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, she refused to
testify unless she received formal statutory immunity.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 5662. See United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 819 (1976).
118. United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917
(1979).
119. United States v. Praetorius, No. 79-1134, slip op. at 5662 (2d Cir. Dec. 10, 1979).
120. For other Second Circuit immunity cases, see United States v. Lang, 589 F.2d 92
(2d Cir. 1978) (defendant's due process claim rejected on the basis of the traditional "executive discretion" argument, the absence of government bad faith, the non-exculpatory nature
of the potential witness' testimony, important policy considerations concerning the prosecutor's subsequent burden, and the fact that a reverse immunity situation was not present);
United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 249 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976)
("[Tihe government [was not] obligated to grant immunity to the [proposed defense witnesses] . . . so that they could be called to testify." This was evidently based on the nonexculpatory nature of the proposed evidence).
121. See notes 68-83 supra and accompanying text.
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DePalma.2 An indictment was filed in 1978 charging multiple defendants with bankruptcy fraud, securities fraud, obstruction of
justice, and racketeering'2 with regard to the operation of the
Westchester Premier Theatre in Tarrytown, New York. The gravamen of the charge against defendant Leonard Horwitz was that he
fraudulently induced Warner Communications, Inc. to invest in
theatre stock by bribing two of the corporation's officials, Jay Emmett and Solomon Weiss. After the government rested its case in
the first trial," 4 Horwitz subpoenaed Emmett and Weiss and was
advised that they both intended to invoke the fifth amendment if
called to testify.' 25 Horwitz requested the granting of use immunity
to Emmett and Weiss, or alternatively, for admission of their grand
jury testimony pursuant to rule 804(b)(5).111 The government declined to grant immunity, and despite the court's determination
that the witnesses' grand jury testimony was exculpatory,' 27 Judge
Sweet sustained the government's objection to the proffered evidence."' No due process objection was preserved, however, because
a mistrial resulted.

29

Upon retrial, Horwitz again subpoenaed Emmett and Weiss who
both took the stand and invoked their fifth amendment right
122. 476 F. Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), appeal docketed sub noma. United States v.
Horwitz, No. 79-1315 (2d Cir. Sept. 13, 1979). The court avoided the bad faith question by
not expressly adopting any standard of review. Id. at 780 n.13.
123. The proof against Horwitz was confined to the latter three charges. Id. at 776 n.1.
124. The principal evidence against Horwitz was gained through the immunized testimony of Norman Brodsky and the testimony of Bruce Kosman who had plea-bargained with
the government in exchange for his cooperation. See notes 137-42 infra and accompanying
text.
125. United States v. DePalma, No. 78-401, slip op. at 1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1978).
126. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(5) provides in part:
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness: . . .
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the
court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B)
the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the
general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. ...
127. United States v. DePalma, No. 78-401, slip op. at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1978).
128. Id. at 3. The interests of justice were not sufficient to invoke the exception of FED.
R. EvID. 804(b)(5) to the hearsay rule.
129. The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. United States v. DePalma, 476
F. Supp. 775, 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), appeal docketed sub noma. United States v. Horwitz, No.
79-1315 (2d Cir. Sept. 13, 1979).
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against self-incrimination. When the court asked the government
if it would grant use immunity to the witnesses, the Assistant
United States attorney responded in the negative because both
men were subject to continuing investigation. "' The jury convicted
the defendants' 32 on May 22, 1979. Three weeks later Horwitz
moved for acquittal or, alternatively, for a new trial, alleging that
he was denied due process because of the government's selective
exercise of its immunity power. Horwitz' due process claim was
preserved because he made a timely showing 3 that the government's refusal to extend immunity to uncooperative defense wit-34
nesses would result in the exclusion of exculpatory evidence.'
Judge Sweet agreed that there had been a due process violation
and, in an opinion rendered on August 15, 1979,'13 revealed the rationale of his holding:
Horwitz was deprived of the due process of law because broad immunity was
granted to government witness Brodsky and, to a lesser extent, Kosman,
while two witnesses to the events at issue sought to be called by Horwitz
were unavailable because of the government's failure to grant them even
3
limited use immunity. 5
130. It is unclear from the record whether this request was made sua sponte. Regardless,
the pertinent procedural issue is whether the request made at the conclusion of the government's case in the second trial was timely. Due to the fact that a similar request was made
during the first trial, see text accompanying note 126 supra, the government was obviously
aware of Horwitz' desire for defense witness immunity before commencement of the second
trial and could not therefore claim prejudice. See United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512,
514 (4th Cir. 1979).
131. 476 F. Supp. at 777.
132. Horwitz was found guilty on all counts. Id. at 776.
133. See note 130 supra.
134. The government contends that there was an insufficient showing that Emmett and
Weiss would offer exculpatory evidence per their grand jury testimony. Brief for Government, supra note 27, at 49. Conversely, there was no indication that the witnesses were not
going to adhere to their sworn grand jury testimony. Brief for Appellee, supra note 28, at 47.
There was no requirement that witnesses will definitely offer exculpatory evidence if they
are granted immunity. No one can predict with certitude what a witness will actually testify
to once on the stand. It should be sufficient that a witness has knowledge of or access to
relevant evidence. The very existence of the exculpatory grand jury statements makes the
showing in DePalma greater than in Singleton v. Lefkowitz, 583 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979), where the court found that the potential witness would
have provided favorable evidence which was neither cumulative nor irrelevant despite defense counsel's ignorance as to what the witness would testify.
135. The government appealed on September 13, 1979. Oral argument' before a three
judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, JJ. Feinberg,
Smith and Owen (sitting by designation from the Southern District of New York) presiding,
was heard on January 23, 1980.
136. Id. at 777 (footnote omitted). The court later remarked that "the foundation of the

902

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. VIII

Because "selectivity" was a decisive factor in the court's judgment,
it would be helpful to examine the nature of the government's
agreement with Brodsky, its principal witness, and with Kosman
and Carino, two lesser figures, and to evaluate the impact of their
testimony at Horwitz' trial.
Brodsky initially entered into an agreement with the government
near the end of 1977. He was told that if he cooperated by taperecording incriminating conversations with Horwitz and others the
government would probably grant him immunity. Fifteen of the
twenty recordings introduced into evidence at the second trial were
taped by Brodsky before he received informal letter immunity'37 in
government's case against Horwitz was built by means of a far-reaching immunity grant.
476 F.. Supp. at 781.
137. Letter from Robert B. Fiske, Jr., United States Attorney (by Nathaniel H.
Akerman, Assistant United States Attorney) to Andrew Maloney, Esq. (Feb. 13, 1978), reprinted in Joint Appendix on Appeal at 53-54, United States v. Horwitz, No. 79-1315 (2d
Cir. Sept. 13, 1979). In return for his cooperation, Brodsky was promised immunity from
prosecution for any potential charge based upon information currently known to the office of
the United States Attorney or supplied to it by Brodsky. However, if Brodsky were to commit any future crimes, give perjured testimony, or violate any provision of the agreement,
the agreement would be null and void.
The Court juxtaposes "limited use" immunity conferred by statute with "broad, farreaching" immunity conferred informally by letter agreement, see notes 134-35 supra and
accompanying text, but never adequately explains the difference between them. Indeed,
some courts operate under the assumption that letter immunity is equivalent to use immunity. See United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512, 514 n.2 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511, 513 n.3 (2d Cir. 1976). The possible invalidity of this assumption has
been recognized. United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512, 514 n.2 (4th Cir. 1979).
There are obvious differences between the two types of immunity vis-a-vis the government. The government in effect granted transactional immunity to Brodsky and thus foreclosed any possibility of his future prosecution. If it had granted immunity pursuant to 18
U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003 (1976), the government theoretically would have retained such power of
prosecution. See note 53 supra. It is equally important to evaluate how each immunity grant
operates to elicit testimony favorable to the party requesting it, i.e., whether full and truthful disclosure or perjured testimony is likely to occur. Under the informal agreement Brodsky
apparently would have little reason to lie because if he did, the entire agreement would be
voided and he would be prosecutable for any and all known crimes. Under the statute, immunity cannot be revoked despite perjurious testimony. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976)(untruthful witness still prosecutable for lying under immunity grant). This distinction disappears when instances of non-prosecutable perjury are present. Moreover, a witness'
motivation for offering perjured testimony is relevant in assessing the effect of immunized
testimony on the adverse party. A witness' ostensible reluctance to commit perjury when
testifying under an informal grant of immunity does not necessarily imply that he would lie
and inculpate the defendant more if compelled to testify by statute.
If the primary concern is a properly balanced trial, it is immaterial whether the government grants statutory immunity or informal letter immunity to a prosecution witness. A
prosecution witness who testifies under an immunity agreement is more helpful to the gov-
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February, 1978.138 On appeal to the Second Circuit, the government
argues that its case was not "built" on its eventual grant of immunity to Brodsky because the majority of the tapes were recorded
before any grant was made.'39 This contention fails to account for
the fact that the likelihood of the government's immunity grant
was certainly the impetus for Brodsky's acts. 4 ' Moreover, Brodsky's testimony at trial, apart from the tapes, played a major role
in the government's case.' This testimony was given after Brodsky
had received letter immunity.
The testimony of Kosman and Carino also provided support for
the prosecution. Although they too did not receive formal statutory
immunity,"' their willingness to cooperate was due to arrangements with the government assuring them of future leniency.
It is impossible to accurately assess the weight a jury has accorded particular items of evidence during its deliberation. Never-*
theless, it would be difficult to deny that the testimony of the three
government witnesses, in toto, was sufficiently convincing to aid
the jury in its conclusion that Horwitz was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It was for this reason that, in fashioning a remedy,
Judge Sweet rejected acquittal and dismissal of the indictment as
ernment and more damaging to the defendant than if there been no such agreement. See
Note, The Sixth Amendment Right To Have Use Immunity Granted To Defense Witnesses,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1.266, 1268 n.15 (1978).
138. Brief for Government, supra note 27, at 5-6.
139. Id. at 27 n.*.
140. He had a lot to lose since he faced a possible 2000 years in jail for past crimes,
according to his own approximation, 476 F. Supp. at 779. The likelihood of an actual grant
was great and was in fact forthcoming.
141. The majority of incriminating testimony against Horwitz was offered at trial by
Brodksy. See Brief for Government, supra note 27, at 8-12.
142. Kosman entered into a plea bargain cooperation agreement with the government.
See Letter from Robert B. Fiske, Jr., United States Attorney (by Nathaniel H. Akerman,
Assistant United States Attorney) to John Doyle, Esq. (June 22, 1978), reprinted in Joint
Appendix on Appeal at 56-58, United States v. Horwitz, No. 79-1315 (2d Cir. Sept. 13, 1979).
However, Kosman thought he was testifying pursuant to an immunity grant. 476 F. Supp. at
777 n.6.
The government refutes Judge Sweet's statement that "[plart of Carino's plea arrangement was a promise by the government that Carino would not receive more than five years
in jail for charges that he was pleading guilty to in New Jersey." 476 F. Supp. at 777 n.7. It
contends that the promise was made, not by the United States government, but rather by
the State of New Jersey. Brief for Government, supra note 27, at 5 n.*. However, the alleged
imbalance at trial due to a one-sided immunity grant would be the same regardless of the
identity of the promisor; Carino testified while fully aware of the promise of the reduced
maximum sentence.
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too drastic."' Rather, the court held that "[b]ecause the constitutional defect can be remedied, Horwitz' motion for a new trial is
granted, and upon such retrial Brodsky's testimony will be excluded unless the requested use immunity is granted to Emmett
and Weiss."'" Although the court remarked that the interests of
justice would best be served if the latter course were chosen by the
government,' the very fact that the former option was acceptable
demonstrates that the government's selective use of its immunity
power played a critical role in the court's analysis.
It is perplexing that the court has apparently conditioned Horwitz' right to have his witnesses immunized upon the fortuity that
the government has granted immunity to a major prosecution witness." 6 The remedy reveals the court's belief that the absence of
the proposed crucial testimony would not of itself have denied Horwitz a fair trial. This is no doubt a function of the court's conception of the wrong done to the defendant; that is, an imbalanced
trial due to one-sided immunization rather than an imbalanced
trial due to defendant's inability to present a complete defense.
However, because the imbalance may be blatant in the first instance does not necessarily mean that a due process violation has
occurred or that there is no constitutional deprivation in the second
instance. Defendant's wrong is not rectified by putting him in the
position he would have been in had there been no immunization of
a prosecution witness. Judge Sweet's remedy is therefore perfectly
suited to his misconception. In redressing defendant's wrong, why
should it not be permissible to take a crucial weapon away from
the government if it is proper to arm the defendant with a similar
weapon?
Whether the court would have reached the same conclusion had
Brodsky provided the same inculpatory testimony without the
grant of immunity is unclear. The trial still would have been in143. 476 F. Supp. at 781 n.15, 782.
144. Id. at 782. Horwitz contends that because this order is cast in the alternative, it is
not appealable as a suppression order under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976) ("An appeal by the
United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or order of a district court
suppressing or excluding evidence . . ."). Brief for Appellee, supra note 28, at 15-17. The
court considered it appealable, 476 F. Supp. at 782 n.17. See also United States v. Cannone,
528 F.2d 296, 298 (2d Cir. 1975).
145. I.e., "a third trial with immunized testimony by witnesses from both sides.
Id. at 782.
146. Brief for Government, supra note 27, at 30.
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balanced'47 and the defense placed in the same position regardless
of whether the government's case were built by a grant of immunity or by the independent cooperation of a relevant witness.
Selective use of the executive immunity power should not be determinative in resolving a defendant's due process claim.'48 Fulfilling both the procedural and substantive requirements should be
sufficient. The selective use of executive immunity can only serve
to strengthen a defendant's due process claim. The defendant's
right to criminal discovery can still be abridged in the absence of
damaging testimony by a prosecution witness, whether or not
immunized.
DePalma is unique in that the absence of prosecutorial misconduct 9 was held not to be a bar to defendant's due process claim.
However, the court was careful to avoid formulating a general standard in determining whether a defendant has met his burden in
asserting a due process immunity claim: "On the peculiar facts of
this case, however, the court concludes that such burden has been
met by Horwitz."' 5 ° The court first emphasized the government's
grant of selective immunity as the root of defendant's constitutional deprivation. Attention was thus focused on the actions of the
prosecution rather than on defendant's incomplete defense. Subse147. Whether defendant would have been deprived of due process still depends on his
ability to present an adequate defense.
148. No clear holding has emerged regarding the role "selectivity" is to play in immunity-due process cases. The Earl footnote, see text accompanying note 26 supra, is merely a
suggestion that the immunity statute could be applied so as to deprive a defendant of a fair
trial. Although DePalma concluded that "selectivity" was the source of the unconstitutional
imbalance at defendant's trial, the decision's utility is diminished by the court's failure to
formulate any general standard to be applied in defense witness immunity cases; it limited
its holding to "the peculiar facts of this case ..
" 476 F. Supp. at 780 n.13. Turkish
promulgates an "availability rather than use" approach to selective-immunity analyses, see
text accompanying note 85 supra, but this, too, was only dictum.
149. 476 F. Supp. at 777 n.5 ("no finding of bad faith or intent on the part of the prosecutor is made by the court in connection with the disposition of this motion").
One court has characterized DePalma as an "unfair conduct" case. United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512, 517-18 (4th Cir. 1979). Klauber interprets DePalma as based on the conclusion that what the government did was "to pick and choose among those principally involved in the alleged scheme to defraud as to whom to call and whom effectively to bar
defendant from using." Id. at 518. Although selective use of the executive immunity power
necessarily involves "picking and choosing" whom to immunize, it is not equivalent to an
egregious Morrison "intimidation," see text accompanying notes 92-94 supra, as Klauber
contends. Moreover, a reading of government bad faith into the decision is refuted by
DePalma's express finding.
150. 476 F. Supp. at 780 n.13.
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quently, the court abandons its focus on prosecutorial conduct and
the Herman bad faith standard in reaching its conclusion. The latter course of action is laudable.' Nevertheless, the "government
conduct" factor should not be eliminated from the scheme, 52 as
was ostensibly done in DePalma.
Another of the "peculiar facts"' which characterized DePalma
relates to the "independent source" burden placed upon the government by Kastigar. The court noted that "the evidence sought
by the defense . . . [was] affected by the government's continuing
'.'.."154
Despite
investigation of the potential defense witnesses .
his finding of prosecutorial good faith, Judge Sweet's reference to
the Kastigar burden indicates his belief that government immunization of the two defense witnesses would not thwart their future
prosecution. The government contends that this fact does not further the argument that the defendant's rights have been violated.'
While this is true, the question whether defense witnesses are currently under investigation is relevant in the weighing process; such
a fact is important in determining whether the government is justified in withholding immunity even in the face of a perhaps incomplete defense for the defendant.'
V.

The Government Burden of Proof: A Proposed Solution

The Kastigar burden, as the Supreme Court has noted, is a
heavy one. 157 It has been characterized as oftentimes insurmountable and tantamount to having granted transactional immunity, 18
and, as a consequence, leading to the "escape from trial and punishment of someone guilty of an offense against society and its
laws."' However, this burden is significantly reduced if the gov151.
152.
153.

See note 103 supra.
See text accompanying notes 176-77 infra.
476 F. Supp. at 780 n.13. See also note 28 supra.

154.

476 F. Supp. at 781.

155. Brief for Government, supra note 27, at 29.
156. See notes 157-76 infra and accompanying text.
157. 406 U.S. 441, 461 (1972).
158. United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973).
159. United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512, 520 (4th Cir. 1979). See also United States
v. Nemes, 555 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1977) (prosecutor's disclaimer regarding his access to
compelled testimony does not preclude possibility that someone else, earlier in the chain of
investigation, has seen it). See generally Note, Federal Witness Immunity Problems and
Practices Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003, 14 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 275, 282-86 (1976) (successful
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ernment already has evidence against the witness.6 0 In DePalma,
the government's investigation of Emmett and Weiss had been proceeding for at least two years. Horwitz asserts this fact, as well as
the availability of the witnesses' unimmunized grand jury testimony, as reasons for the invalidity of the government's claim that
immunization of the defense witnesses at defendant's trial would
make their future prosecution a practical impossibility.' The government concedes that substantial evidence already exists implicating the two men in the stock fraud charged in the indictment." 2
However, a grant of immunity to Emmett and Weiss would effectively prevent the government from calling Horwitz as a witness at
their subsequent trial. If permitting Emmett and Weis to give immunized testimony results in Horwitz' conviction, the availability
of Horwitz to testify" 3 would be impermissibly "derived from" the
original immunization of the two witnesses.'6 ' Moreover, Horwitz
would have heard the immunized testimony of Emmett and Weiss
at his own trial. It would be impossible for the government to prove
that Horwitz' testimony at the Warner officials' trial was not in
165
any way related to what he had heard earlier.
prosecution of immunized witnesses are difficult and exceedingly rare); Carlson, Witness Immunity In Modern Trials: Observation on the Uniform Rule of Criminal Procedure, 67 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 131, 134 (1976) (subsequent prosecution of immunized witnesses
virtually impossible).
160. See Note, The Sixth Amendment Right to Have Use Immunity Granted to Defense
Witnesses, 91 HARV. L. lbv. 1266, 1274-79 (1978). See also note 53 supra.
161. Brief for Appellee, supra note 28, at 43-44.
162. Brief for Government, supra note 27, at 39.
163. A convicted Horwitz would make an ideal government witness. Id. at 39-40.
164. At first it may seem illogical to state that exculpatory testimony could lead to a
conviction. However, Judge Learned Hand, when speaking of the power of a witness' demeanor, remarked that "such evidence may satisfy the tribunal, not only that the witness'
testimony is not true, but that the truth is the opposite of his story." Dyer v. MacDougall,
201 F.2d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1952).
165. In United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1976), the immunized grand jury
testimony of one Kurzer resulted in two indictments against one Steinman. Steinman decided to plead guilty to lesser charges in return for his cooperation in indicting Kurzer.
Kurzer moved to dismiss the indictment on the theory that it was the product of his original
immunized testimony. The trial court dismissed the indictment, holding that "the immunized Kurzer testimony led the government to Steinman who in turn led the government to
Kurzer." Id. at 515 (quoting United States v. Kurzer, No. 74-288 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1957)).
The government appealed, citing as error the trial court's refusal to consider Steinman's
testimony "that his decision to cooperate was based on factors entirely independent of the
indictment to which Kurzer's testimony had contributed." 534 F.2d at 515. The Second Circuit noted:
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The issue therefore is whether the loss of a defendant's testimony
in a subsequent prosecution of a witness who is immunized at the
defendant's trial would be debilitating to the government's case.
Usually, where substantial evidence of complicity is accumulated
prior to any immunity grant, such loss would probably not prove
damaging enough to warrant the denial of a defendant's legitimate
request for defense witness immunity. However, special circumstances are present where ladder-climbing situations are involved.
In a far-ranging conspiracy of the variety alleged in DePalma, testimonial evidence is an especially crucial element;"'6 to permit a
higher-up to give immunized testimony at defendant's trial would
be to emasculate any government attempts to climb the criminal
ladder. Assuming the defendant has met all the procedural and
substantive criteria, it nevertheless would be improper to grant immunity in these situations despite selective use of executive immunity power. DePalma ignores the practical consequences, of its ruling, consequences which demand reevaluation of the present
procedures of due process analysis of defense witness immunity
questions.
Some commentators" 7 contend that the Kastigar burden is the
same in situations where the prosecution grants immunity to its
own witnesses and where use immunity is extended to defense witnesses. While the argument is plausible, its practical inadequacies
It is not seriously disputed that Steinman's identity was known to the Government
before it had ever heard of Kurzer, and that Steinman was a target of the investigation from its earliest stages. But since Steinman's identity and potential value as a
witness were not discovered through Kurzer, the only way in which Steinman's testimony could be derived, either directly or indirectly, from Kurzer's information is if
the giving of that information contributed to Steinman's decision to testify. Steinman's motivation is thus directly relevant to the central question in this case.
Id. at 517. On remand, the trial court found that Steinman's testimony was impermissibly
derived from Kurzer's immunized testimony. 422 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The fact
that Steinman did not hear Kurzer's immunized testimony (the latter had testified at a
grand jury proceeding) did not affect the court's holding. In DePalma, the government's
"independent source" burden would be more pronounced because Emmett and Weiss would
testify in open court; the nexus between Horwitz and the tainted testimony is self-evident.
166. Interview with Nathaniel H. Akerman, Assistant United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York, in New York City (Feb. 22, 1980). See also NEWSWVEEK, Aug.
27, 1979, at 71, col. 1 (A former United States attorney remarked that " '[the only way to
make white-collar cases stick is to break the bonds between the defendants . . . . Usually
the price is immunity.' ").
167. See, e.g., Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REv. 71, 169-70
(1974).
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are evident. In the former case the government has voluntarily
granted immunity to the prosecution witness while cognizant of the
substantial burden it would be required to shoulder should it eventually decide to prosecute. The "public interest" factors have undoubtedly been weighed' and the government has concluded that
the high probability of losing future prosecution is warranted in the
particular case. However, if the defendant were deemed to possess
the unilateral right to compel the government to extend immunity
to his witnesses, then the weighing process that had been incorporated into the government's decision regarding prosecution witnesses would be unjustifiably eliminated." 9 This would be evident
in cases where the threshold factors were established but no preliminary determination as to the government's Kastigar burden
had been made. The necessity of some type of evidentiary hearing
is therefore demonstrated so that the prosecutor's discretion is not
severely undercut and the interests of justice are best served.
Such a proposal has not been warmly received. 10 The court in
Herman remarked that "public interest" review "would necessarily
require the court to weigh, if only in limited circumstances, the
considerations that are traditionally associated with the decision to
prosecute."'' It is submitted, however, that intrusion into an exec168. The Guidelines provide:
In determining whether it may be necessary to the public interest to obtain testimony
or other information from a person, the attorney for the government should weigh all
relevant considerations, including:
(a) the importance of the investigation or prosecution to effective enforcement
of the criminal laws;
(b) the value of the person's testimony or information to the investigation or
prosecution;
(c) the likelihood of prompt and full compliance with a compulsion order, and
the effectiveness of available sanctions if there is no such compliance;
(d) the person's relative culpability in connection with the offense or offenses
being investigated or prosecuted, and his history with respect to criminal
activity;
(e) the possibility of successfully prosecuting the person prior to compelling
him to testify or produce information; and
(f) the likelihood of adverse collateral consequences to the person if he testifies or provides information under a compulsion order.
GUIDELINES, supra note 23, § 3.
169. A defendant's primary concern is with acquittal, not with the "public interest."
Brief for Government, supra note 27, at 36.
170. But see Virgin Islands v. Smith, No. 79-1212 (3d Cir. Feb. 5, 1980). See also note
178 infra.
171. 589 F.2d at 1200.
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utive domain at this point is justifiable in order to avoid a more
severe usurpation which would result under a restricted "criminal
discovery" analysis.' Moreover, the proposed review would be
more circumscribed than that suggested by Herman. The actual
decision whether the proposed defense witness will be prosecuted in
the future remains in the hands of the government. If no such investigation is contemplated, the scope of the evidentiary hearing is
greatly reduced; the presence of other factors"' would simply mandate the grant of immunity to the defense witnesses. ff the government plans to conduct, or is in the midst of an investigation, the
court must assess the prosecution's Kastigar burden. This burden
varies with the amount and nature of evidence already accumulated and with the scope of the prosecution; that is, whether it is a
ladder-climbing situation or one that involves a more limited scope
of culpability. Any danger of institutional abuse'74 can be mitigated
by an explicit showing that the government has a good-faith intention to eventually indict the witness based upon a substantial foundation of suspicion.
The only unresolved issue remaining is that of Brady and
prosecutorial misconduct. The motivation for including bad faith
as one of the prerequisites for a due process claim is the fear that
vested executive discretion will be diluted if Brady's "irrespective
of good faith or bad faith" rule were to be applied.175 That fear has
been assuaged in the proposed structure because the government's
interest is taken into account, albeit at a different stage than it had
been previously. The various procedural and substantive factors
demonstrate how the defendant has been deprived of due process.
However, prosecutorial misconduct, just a$ selectivity, serves only
to magnify the constitutional violation. It should not be prerequisite because the defendant still has an incomplete defense whether
the government intimidated the witness into claiming his fifth
172. Under this approach, the defendant's rights are considered independently of any
governmental interest in future prosecution. See generally Westen, The Compulsory Process
Clause, 73 MICH. L. REv. 71, 121-23 (1974).
173. See text accompanying notes 68-83 supra.
174. An example would be where the witness is not currently subject to investigation and
yet the government claims it plans to embark upon one.
175. In Herman, the court required a substantial evidentiary showing to justify reversal
on the ground of a due process violation "in view of our governmental systems strong tradition of deference to prosecutorial discretion ...
" 589 F.2d 1191, 1203 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979).
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amendment right or whether the witness did so of his own free will.
Therefore, if the court were to find at the evidentiary hearing that
the government's Kastigar burden would be surmountable, then
the defense witness should be immunized irrespective of government good faith. Were the court to reach an opposite conclusion,
only prosecutorial bad faith would be sufficient to trigger a valid
due process claim by the defendant.
The proposed evidentiary hearing need not be authorized by congressional legislation. Just as courts are deemed to possess the
power to order a remedial grant of statutory use immunity to a
defense witness in circumstances involving prosecutorial misconduct,"'7 there should be no need for legislative mandate to empower
courts to act in the absence of government bad faith. Unconstitutional abuse is as present in the latter situation as it is in the former in cases where the government has refused to grant a defense
witness immunity when it would be "necessary to the public interest."' 77 The public interest would be disserved by denying a defendant a fair trial. Because courts have no inherent power to grant
immunity,7 8 their only power is to impose sanctions for the govern176. See, e.g., id. at 1204.
177. 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b)(1) (1976). See note 34 supra.
178. See United States v. Housand, 550 F.2d 818, 824 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
970 (1977); United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 190 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Turkish, No. 78-251, slip op. at 8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-1326 (2d
Cir. Oct. 17, 1979). But see Virgin Islands v. Smith, No. 79-1212 (3d Cir. Feb. 5, 1980). Dicta
in Herman regarding the possibility of a judicially-fashioned immunity, 589 F.2d at 1204-05,
was recently adopted by the Third Circuit as an alternative holding in Smith, id., slip op. at
18-19. At trial, three of the four named defendants sought to introduce the potentially exculpatory testimony of one Ernesto Sanchez, a witness who claimed his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The court found that the United States attorney's decision
not to consent to immunity was made in bad faith, and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Sanchez should be immunized so as not to violate the
defendants' due process rights.
The court found inherent judicial power to grant witness immunity by coupling cases involving a defendant's right to present an effective defense, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284 (1973) (Mississippi's strict adherence to its evidentiary rules prevented defendant's
disclosure of exculpatory evidence); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Roviaro v.
United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), with those recognizing the judiciary's power to suppress
testimony in order to vindicate constitutional rights, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377 (1968) (testimony at fourth amendment suppression hearing); In re Grand Jury
Investigatioh, 587 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1978)(testimony predicate to Speech and Debate Clause
defense). If the defendant meets a threshold burden similar to that outlined in this Note, see
text accompanying notes 68-83 supra (with the added requirement that the testimony be
clearly exculpatory), and the government cannot present any legitimate countervailing interests, the court may grant judicial immunity. However, if the district court determines at the
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ment's unjustified failure to grant a defendant's request for immunization of his key witnesses. This amounts to forcing the prosecution to choose between extending immunity or suffering dismissal.
Although this may be a drastic remedy, especially in instances
where incriminating evidence already exists against a defendant, it
is the only remedy which would cure the trial's constitutional
defect. "'
Howard Schwartz

evidentiary hearing that judicial immunity is not required, then statutory immunity, i.e.,
compelling the government to extend immunity pursuant to section 6003, may be warranted.
Under a statutory theory, only a showing of relevancy need be made by the defendant although the Herman bad faith standard is a prerequisite.
While the concept of judicial immunity is analytically appealing, it is unclear whether
Congress intended 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1976) to be the sole source of an immunity grant to
a witness. The procedure proposed in part V of this Note takes this possibility into account
by dealing only with statutory immunity.
It should also be noted that, if statutory immunity is substituted for judicial immunity,
Smith's formulation is essentially that proposed in part V of this Note. An insufficient showing by the defendant in Smith's first step, e.g., the balancing test reveals that the government would have an insurmountable Kastigarburden, does not foreclose the possibility of an
immunity grant if government bad faith is revealed in step two. See text accompanying
notes 175-76 supra.
179. The same if true for situations involving the government's selective use of its immunity power. See text accompanying notes 146-49 supra.

